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In this paper we deal with incoherent partial conditional probabilities assessments. Such kind of evaluations arise because
often it is natural to give evaluations of probability only on relevant events, that are judged under speciﬁc circumstances.
And it can happen that the numerical values do not ﬁt well with each other, especially when information comes from dif-
ferent sources.
Inconsistency, if not adjusted, can be dangerous. In fact, often the assessment is intended to be used for inference pur-
poses, i.e. to see how a further (conditional) event can be evaluated consistently with the initial assessment. Of course,
the inferential results are meaningful only if the prior information encompassed in the initial assessment is coherent by
itself.
Hence it is quite natural to search for a coherent assessment on the same domain that will preserve the opinion expressed
by the initial assessment as much as possible, without introducing exogenous information. This goal is obtained by minimiz-
ing some kind of distance among partial conditional assessments.
Distances and pseudo-distances among probability distributions are usually measured through divergencies (e.g. Euclid-
ean distance, Kulback–Leibler divergence, Csiszár f-divergences, etc.). Some of them can be applied only among uncondi-
tional full probability distributions; others could be applied to our context of partial conditional assessments (see for
example [10,15]), but do not have a fully convincing probabilistic justiﬁcation, being purely geometrical tools. Hence, for
our purpose, in this paper we introduce an index of ‘‘discrepancy” among partial conditional probability assessments which
is derived by a particular scoring rule. Such a scoring rule is inspired by the one introduced by Lad in [12] for unconditional
probability distributions, and adapted here to partial conditional frameworks.
2. A short description of the problem
We brieﬂy describe the problem.. All rights reserved.
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main of his/her evaluations. The events Ei’s usually represent the situations under consideration, while the Hi’s usually rep-
resent the different contexts, or scenarios, under which the Ei’s are evaluated.
The assessor is supposed to elicit numerical values p ¼ ðp1; . . . ; pnÞ thought as his/her honest evaluation of the probabil-
ities PðEijHiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n. The problem consists to adjust such an evaluation when it turns out to be incoherent, i.e. incom-
patible with any probability distribution.
2.1. Preliminaries
The basic events E1; . . . ; En; H1; . . . ;Hn can be endowed with logical constraints, that represent dependencies among par-
ticular conﬁgurations of them (e.g. incompatibilities, implications, partial or total coincidences, etc.).
In the following EiHi will denote the logical connection ‘‘Ei and Hi”, E
c
i will indicate ‘‘not Ei” and the event H
0 ¼ Wni¼1Hi will
represent the whole set of contexts.
For the sake of simplicity we skip from the present job the two extreme situations of incompatibility between situation
and scenario or of inclusion of the scenario in the situation, i.e.EiHi ¼ / or Hi# Ei: ð1ÞIn fact, in these two cases the probability values are compulsorily determined by coherenceEijHi ¼ /) PðEijHiÞ ¼ 0; Hi# Ei ) PðEijHiÞ ¼ 1; ð2Þand any violation of them can be trivially adjusted.
Starting with the basic events E1; . . . ; En; H1; . . . ;Hn, it is possible to span a sample space X ¼ fx1; . . . ;xkg, where xj rep-
resents a generic atom that is the minimal element in the algebra generated by Ei;Hi. Note that the sample space X, together
with H0, are not part of the assessment but only auxiliary tools.
Every probability distribution a : PðXÞ ! R corresponds to a nonnegative vector a ¼ ½a1; . . . ;ak, with aj ¼ aðxjÞ, then for
every event E it results aðEÞ ¼Pxj #Eaj.
We need to introduce a nested hierarchy among sets of probability distributions:
 let A ¼ a ¼ ½a1; . . . ;ak;
Pk
1ai ¼ 1; aj P 0; j ¼ 1; . . . ; k
n o
represents the whole set of probability distributions on X;
 letA0 ¼ fa 2 AjaðH0Þ ¼ 1g be the subset of probability distributions onX that concentrate all the probability mass on
the contemplated scenarios;
 let A1 ¼ fa 2 A0jaðHiÞ > 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ;ng be the subset of probability distributions on X that give positive probability
to every scenario;
 let A2 ¼ fa 2 A1j0 < aðEiHiÞ < aðHiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;ng be the subset of probability distributions that avoid boundary val-
ues {0,1} for the conditional probabilities.
It is easy to see that the sets Ai are convex sets and A0 is the closure of A2 (and A1) in the usual topology.
Note that in conditional frameworks the focusing on A0 is commonly done to avoid unpleasant consequences. See Walley
[16] about Avoiding Uniform Loss assessments or Holzer [9] about the Principle of Conditional Coherence.
2.2. Coherence
As already mentioned, we focus our attention on inconsistent assessments p. Consistency for partial assessments can be
reduced to the compatibility with a well established mathematical model. For conditional probabilities the reference models
are the so called full conditional probabilities, as introduced by Dubins [8] and in line also with De Finetti [7], Krauss [11] and
Rényi [14] thoughts. Full conditional probabilities are characterized by the following set of axioms:
Deﬁnition 1. Given a Boolean algebra B, a full conditional probability on B  B0 B0 ¼ B n f;g
 
is a function P : B  B0 ! ½0;1
such that
(i) PðjHÞ is a ﬁnitely additive probability on B for any given H in B0;
(ii) PðHjHÞ ¼ 1 for all H 2 B0;
(iii) PðAjCÞ ¼ PðAjBÞPðBjCÞ for every A 2 B; B; C 2 B0, with A#B#C.
Note that, whenever (i) and (ii) are satisﬁed, condition (iii) is equivalent to
(iii0) PðABjCÞ ¼ PðBjCÞPðAjBCÞ for every A; B 2 B; C 2 B; BC 2 B0.
The pairs ðAjHÞ 2 B  B0 are called conditional events.
Consequently we have:
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there exists a full conditional probability P0ðjÞ deﬁned on PðXÞ  PðXÞ0 (with PðXÞ the power set of X) which agrees with
PðjÞ on E.
Every probability distribution a 2 A1 generates a coherent assessments qa on E through the usual formula1 Bou
with ouqai ¼
P
xj #EiHi
ajP
xj #Hi
aj
8 i ¼ 1; . . . ;n: ð3ÞNote that qa is a continuous function of a when a 2 A1.
When a 2 A0, previous formula (3) deﬁnes qa only onEa :¼ fEijHi 2 E; aðHiÞ > 0g: ð4Þ
Coherence of qa is guaranteed by the theorem of Coletti [5] and Coletti and Scozzafava [6].
3. A discrepancy measure
Associated to any (coherent or not) assessment p 2 ð0;1Þn over E ¼ ½E1jH1; . . . ; EnjHn we can introduce a scoring rule1SðpÞ :¼
Xn
i¼1
jEiHij ln pi þ
Xn
i¼1
jEci Hij lnð1 piÞ; ð5Þwhere j  j is the indicator function of unconditional events.
Such score SðpÞ is an ‘‘adaptation” of the ‘‘proper scoring rule” for probability distributions proposed by Lad in [12, p. 355].
We have extended it to partial and conditional probability assessments. The motivation of such a score is that, for a condi-
tional event EijHi which is a three-valued logical entity partitioning X in three parts (the atoms satisfying EiHi and thus ver-
ifying the conditional, those satisfying Eci Hi, thus falsifying the conditional, and those not fulﬁlling the context Hi, to which
the conditional may not be applied at all) the assessor ‘‘loses less” the higher are the probabilities assessed for events that are
veriﬁed, and at the same time, the lower are the probabilities assessed for those that are not veriﬁed. The values assessed on
events that turn out to be undetermined do not inﬂuence the score. In fact the realization of the random value SðpÞwhen the
atom xj occurs isSjðpÞ ¼
X
EiHixj
ln pi þ
X
Eci Hixj
lnð1 piÞ: ð6ÞWe can introduce the ‘‘discrepancy” between an assessment p over E and a distribution a 2 A2, with respect to its conditional
coherent assessment qa, asDðp; aÞ :¼ EaðSðqaÞ  SðpÞÞ ¼
Xk
j¼1
aj½SjðqaÞ  SjðpÞ: ð7ÞIt is easy to see thatDðp; aÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
aðEiHiÞ ln qipi
 
þ aðEci HiÞ ln
1 qi
1 pi
 
¼ ð8Þ
¼
Xn
i¼1
aðHiÞ qi ln
qi
pi
 
þ ð1 qiÞ ln
1 qi
1 pi
  
: ð9ÞThe restriction to the distributions a in A2 is because only there the scoring rule SðqaÞ is properly deﬁned. Anyhow it is pos-
sible to extend by continuity Dðp; aÞ to any distribution a in A0 by deﬁningDðp; aÞ :¼
X
ijaðHiÞ>0
aðHiÞ qi ln
qi
pi
 
þ ð1 qiÞ ln
1 qi
1 pi
  
; ð10Þadopting the usual convention 0 lnð0Þ ¼ 0.
3.1. Formal properties of Dðp; aÞ
In the sequel we will use the following two properties:t ln t  t þ 1P 0 8 t P 0; ð11Þ
ln t  t þ 1 6 0 8 t > 0: ð12Þndary values 0 or 1 for the assessed probabilities are avoided to skip technical drawbacks in the deﬁnition of the scoring rule. This is anyhow consistent
r choice of avoiding trivial inconsistencies from the beginning (see (1) and (2), and the associated comments).
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point t = 1. Moreover in (11) and (12) the equality holds if and only if t = 1.
The discrepancy Dðp; aÞ behaves like other common divergences. In fact the following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. Let Dðp; aÞ be deﬁned as in (10). Then Dðp; aÞ is continuous in A0. Moreover
(i) Dðp; aÞP 0 8 a 2 A0;
(ii) for any a 2 A1; Dðp; aÞ ¼ 0 iff p  qa.
Proof. The continuity on A2 is trivial. The continuity on A0 depends on the fact thatq ln
q
p
þ ð1 qÞ ln 1 q
1 p
 
;is bounded for q 2 ð0;1Þ and hence every term inX
ijaðHiÞ>0
aðHiÞ qi ln
qi
pi
 
þ ð1 qiÞ ln
1 qi
1 pi
  
;is continuous even when aðHiÞ tends to 0. To prove (i) it sufﬁces to prove that the functionf ðx; yÞ :¼ x ln x
y
þ ð1 xÞ ln 1 x
1 y
 
; ð13Þis nonnegative for any x 2 ½0;1 and y 2 ð0;1Þ. But (13) can be rewritten asf ðx; yÞ :¼ x ln x
y
 xþ yþ ð1 xÞ ln 1 x
1 y
 
 ð1 xÞ þ ð1 yÞ;so that, letting t :¼ x=y (or t :¼ ð1 xÞ=ð1 yÞ), we have that f ðx; yÞ is the sum of two terms like
t ln t  t þ 1;which are nonnegatives by (11).
(ii) If a lies in A1 we have aðHiÞ > 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n so that Dðp; aÞ results a sum of nonnegative terms. HenceDðp; aÞ ¼ 0() qi ln
pi
qi
 
þ ð1 qiÞ ln
1 pi
1 qi
 
¼ 0 8 i ¼ 1; . . . ;n:Since the function t ln t  t þ 1 vanishes only in t = 1 we haveDðp; aÞ ¼ 0() pi
qi
¼ 1 8 i ¼ 1; . . . ;n;
() p  qa: 
Note that (ii) in Theorem 1 can be easily generalized for a 2 A0. In fact since in (10) there are only terms with aðHiÞ > 0,
we haveDðp; aÞ ¼ 0() PðEijHiÞ ¼ qai 8 EijHi 2 Ea;
where Ea is deﬁned as in (4).
Now we can assert something about the convexity of our discrepancy and about its minimum value.
Theorem 2. Let p be an assessment on E ¼ ½E1jH1; . . . ; EnjHn and Dðp; aÞ deﬁned as in (10), with a 2 A0. Then Dðp; aÞ is a convex
function with respect to a.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that Dðp; aÞ is convex in A2.
The expression (8) of Dðp; aÞ can be written asDðp; aÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
aðEiHiÞ ln aðEiHiÞaðEiHiÞ þ a Eci Hi
  ln pi
 !
þ a Eci Hi
 
ln
a Eci Hi
 
aðEiHiÞ þ a Eci Hi
  lnð1 piÞ
 !" #
: ð14ÞNote that by deﬁnitionaðEiHiÞ ¼
X
xj # EiHi
aj; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n;and then it will sufﬁce to prove the convexity of D with respect to aðEiHiÞ and a Eci Hi
 
; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n.
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we have that x; y 2 ð0;1Þ because a is in A2.
Since D is the sum of 2n terms likef ðx; yÞ :¼ x ln x
xþ y x ln p;in order to prove the convexity of D it is sufﬁcient to prove thatrf ðx0; y0Þðx x0; y y0Þ þ f ðx0; y0Þ 6 f ðx; yÞ:
It is easy to see thatrf ðx0; y0Þ ¼ ln x0x0 þ y0 þ
y0
x0 þ y0
 ln p; x0
x0 þ y0
 
;and then f(x,y) is convex if and only ifx ln
x0ðxþ yÞ
xðx0 þ y0Þ
 
6 x0y xy0
x0 þ y0
:Since x > 0, last inequality reduces toln
x0ðxþ yÞ
xðx0 þ y0Þ
 
6 x0ðxþ yÞ
xðx0 þ y0Þ
 1;that holds by (12) with t :¼ x0ðxþ yÞ=xðx0 þ y0Þ.
Finally, since A0 is the closure of A2 and Dðp; aÞ is continuous in A0, then Dðp; aÞ is convex on A0. h
Theorem 3. Let p be an assessment on E ¼ ½E1jH1; . . . ; EnjHn, then Dðp; aÞ admits a minimum on A0. Moreover, if such minimum
is attained only on A1, then there is a unique coherent assessment qa on E ¼ ½E1jH1; . . . ; EnjHn such that Dðp; aÞ is minimum.
Proof. Since Dðp; Þ is convex in A0 that is a convex and closed set, Dðp; Þ admits minimum on A0.
Anyhow such minimum could not be unique, i.e. there could be a (convex) set of probability distributions each of them
giving the same minimum value mina2A0Dðp; aÞ.
If the minimum of Dðp; Þ is attained only on A1 we can prove that if a; a0 2 A1 minimize Dðp; Þ then qa  qa0 .
At ﬁrst, suppose thatðqaÞi ¼ 0() ðqa0 Þi ¼ 0 8 i ¼ 1; . . . ;n; ð15Þ
ðqaÞi ¼ 1() ðqa0 Þi ¼ 1 8 i ¼ 1; . . . ;n: ð16ÞSo lettingxi :¼ aðEiHiÞ; yi :¼ a Eci Hi
 
; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n; ð17Þ
x0i :¼ a0ðEiHiÞ; y0i :¼ a0 Eci Hi
 
; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n; ð18Þwe havexi ¼ 0() x0i ¼ 0 8 i ¼ 1; . . . ;n;
yi ¼ 0() y0i ¼ 0 8 i ¼ 1; . . . ;n:Consider now the following index setsA :¼ ijxi – 0; yi – 0f g; B :¼ ijxi ¼ 0; yi – 0f g; C :¼ ijxi – 0; yi ¼ 0f g;
and then the function eF : ð0;1Þsþt ! R given byeF ð~x; ~yÞ :¼X
i2A
xi ln
xi
xi þ yi
þ yi ln
yi
xi þ yi
 

X
i2A[C
xi ln pi 
X
i2A[B
yi lnð1 piÞ;where ~x ¼ ðxi1 ; . . . ; xis Þ is the vector of positive components of x and ~y ¼ ðyi1 ; . . . ; yit Þ is the vector of positive components of y.
Note that by the deﬁnitions (17) and (18) it follows that Dðp; aÞ  eFð~x; ~yÞ and then eFð~x0; ~y0Þ ¼ eFð~x; ~yÞ. Moreover Dðp; Þ is
constant in the segment ½a; a0 (the set of minimal point is convex) and then eF is constant in the direction ð~x ~x0; ~y  ~y0Þ. So
we havereFð~x; ~yÞ  ð~x ~x0; ~y  ~y0Þ þ eF ð~x0; ~y0Þ ¼ eF ð~x; ~yÞ; ð19Þ
as reFð~x; ~yÞ  ð~x ~x0; ~y  ~y0Þ is the directional derivative of eF in the direction ð~x ~x0; ~y  ~y0Þ.
SincereFð~x; ~yÞ ¼ X
i2A
ln
xi
xi þ yi

X
i2A[C
lnpi;
X
i2A
ln
yi
xi þ yi

X
i2A[B
lnð1 piÞ
 !
;
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i2A
xi ln
x0i ðxi þ yiÞ
xi x0i þ y0i
 þ yi ln y0i ðxi þ yiÞyi x0i þ y0i  ¼ 0()
X
i2A
xi ln
x0i ðxi þ yiÞ
xi x0i þ y0i
 þ xiy0i  x0i yi
x0i þ y0i
þ yi ln
y0i ðxi þ yiÞ
yi x0i þ y0i
 þ yix0i  y0i xi
x0i þ y0i
¼ 0:Every term in the previous sum can be reduced in two terms of the formln t  t þ 1; t 2 ð0;þ1Þ;
and by (12) we know that each one of such terms is nonpositive and it vanishes if and only if t = 1. Therefore by Eq. (19) it
followsx0i ðxi þ yiÞ
xi x0i þ y0i
  ¼ 1 8 i 2 A;i.e.x0i
x0i þ y0i
¼ xi
xi þ yi
8 i 2 A;that isa0ðEiHiÞ
a0ðEiHiÞ þ a0 Eci Hi
  ¼ aðEiHiÞ
aðEiHiÞ þ a Eci Hi
  8 i 2 A:
It is easy to see that for the index i R A we have ðqaÞi ¼ ðqa0 Þi ¼ 0 or ðqaÞi ¼ ðqa0 Þi ¼ 1. So we have proved that qa  qa0 .
Finally note that we can suppose that (15) and (16) hold without loss of generality. In fact, every distribution b in the
segment ða; a0Þ minimizes Dðp; Þ and givesðqbÞi ¼ 0() ðqaÞi ¼ ðqa0 Þi ¼ 0 8 i ¼ 1; . . . ; n;
ðqbÞi ¼ 1() ðqaÞi ¼ ðqa0Þi ¼ 1 8 i ¼ 1; . . . ; n:Hence all the distributions in ða; a0Þ generate assessments with 0 or 1 in the same components and then give the same
correction.
Since q is continuous on A1 we have qa  qa0 and then
ðqaÞi ¼ 0() ðqa0 Þi ¼ 0 8 i ¼ 1; . . . ; n;
ðqaÞi ¼ 1() ðqa0Þi ¼ 1 8 i ¼ 1; . . . ; n: Separate consideration is needed when the minimum of Dðp; Þ is attained inA0 n A1. In fact in such a case the distribution
that minimizes induces some aðHiÞ ¼ 0.
Theorem 4. If Dðp; Þ attains its minimum value on A0 n A1 and a; a0 2 A0 n A1 are distributions that minimize Dðp; Þ with the
same null conditioning events, then ðqaÞi ¼ ðqa0 Þi for all i such that aðHiÞ > 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that aðHiÞ ¼ a0ðHiÞ ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ; t, while aðHlÞ > 0 and a0ðHlÞ > 0; l ¼
t þ 1; . . . ;n.
Let E ¼ fEtþ1jHtþ1; . . . ; EnjHng; p ¼ ðptþ1; . . . ; pnÞ and X the sample space spanned by E. Notice that the elements of X are
pairwise disjoint and are unions of elements of X.
Consider the distributions b and b0 over X deﬁned bybj ¼
X
xi	 ~xj
ai 8 xj 2 X; ð20Þ
b0j ¼
X
xi	 ~xj
a0i 8 xj 2 X: ð21ÞIt is easy to see thatbðHlÞ ¼ aðHlÞ > 0; ðqaÞl ¼ ðqbÞl ¼ qbl ; l ¼ t þ 1; . . . ;n; ð22Þ
b0ðHlÞ ¼ a0ðHlÞ > 0; ðqa0 Þl ¼ ðqb0 Þl ¼ qb0l ; l ¼ t þ 1; . . . ;n; ð23Þso that both b and b0 result in A1 (the analogous of A1 associated to E).
MoreoverDðp;bÞ ¼
Xn
l¼tþ1
bðHlÞ qbl ln
qbl
pl
 
þ ð1 qbl Þ ln
1 qbl
1 pl
  	
¼ Dðp; aÞ;
724 A. Capotorti et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 718–727and analogously we haveDðp; b0Þ ¼ Dðp; a0Þ:
Since by hypothesis Dðp; aÞ ¼ Dðp; a0Þ, we have Dðp; bÞ ¼ Dðp; b0Þ and applying Theorem 3 on X it follows qb ¼ qb0 ; hence
ðqaÞl ¼ ðqa0 Þl; l ¼ t þ 1; . . . ; n. h
Theorem 5. If a; a0 2 A0 are distributions that minimize Dðp; Þ, then for all i 2 f1; . . . ;ng with aðHiÞ > 0 and a0ðHiÞ > 0 we have
ðqaÞi ¼ ðqa0 Þi.
Proof. Let I and I0 subsets of f1; . . . ;ng deﬁned by
I ¼ fijaðHiÞ > 0g; I0 ¼ ija0ðHiÞ > 0

 
:It is easy to see that all the probability distributionsdr ¼ raþ ð1 rÞa0; r 2 ð0;1Þ;
minimize Dðp; Þ and drðHiÞ > 0 for i 2 I \ I0.
Therefore, by Theorem 4 it follows that for i 2 I \ I0qdr
 
i ¼ qds
 
i 8 r; s 2 ð0;1Þ;
and then, by continuityðqaÞi ¼ ðqa0 Þi 8 i 2 I \ I0: 
Hence, if a 2 A0 minimizes Dðp; Þ then for all i 2 f1; . . . ;ng such that aðHiÞ > 0 we can assert that qi is properly
determined.
Observe that Theorem 5 is a generalization of Theorems 3 and 4. In fact, if I ¼ I0 ¼ f1; . . . ;ng the hypotheses of Theorem 3
are satisﬁed, while if I ¼ I0 – f1; . . . ;ng Theorem 4 applies.
Theorem 6. There exists ~a in A0 such that Dðp; Þ attains its minimum on ~a and such that the number of Hi with ~aðHiÞ > 0 is
maximum. Moreover the associated eqi are uniquely determined.
Proof. LetA :¼ fajDðp; aÞ is minimumg;
andJ :¼ fi : 9a 2 A with aðHiÞ > 0g:
For any j 2 J choose an aj 2 A such that ajðHjÞ > 0. Every ~a (proper) convex combination of faj; j 2 Jg veriﬁes the statement. h
As a straightforward consequence, by deﬁnition of A1, we have the following:
Corollary 7. If there exists a 2 A1 such that Dðp; Þ attains its minimum on a, then all the qi are uniquely determined as
ðqaÞi; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n.
It is quite common to ﬁnd a minimizer a in A1. For example, whenever p is unconditional then, obviously, all the distri-
butions which minimize D are in A1. With respect to a general conditional framework, we found e.g. that all the examples
given in [2] express a minimum in A1. Anyhow it is hard to characterize, from a theoretical point of view, the initial assess-
ments ðE;pÞ which produce a minimum in A1. We can guess that this mainly depends on the logical structure of E similarly
to what happens for the so called locally strong coherence (see [4]). On the other hand, from a practical point of view, the
procedure suggested in Section 4 suddenly reveals if there is a minimum in A1 in its second step.
Note that Theorems 3 and 4, apart from the existence of the optimal solution they guarantee, are quite technical. Never-
theless Theorem 6 and its subsequent Corollary 7 enlighten their signiﬁcance from a practical point of view and they suggest
us how to proceed to ﬁnd the solution, as it will be described in the next section.
4. Our correction procedure
The formal properties of the discrepancy Dðp; aÞ proved in the previous section permit us to propose a procedure to adjust
an initial incoherent assessment with a coherent one.
The initial problem is to ﬁnd an a in A0 with minimum Dðp; aÞ. This procedure starts by looking for a solution a having
maximum Ea (whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 6). In fact step (i2) looks for a solution a which maximizes the
number of Hi such that aðHiÞ > 0. Moreover, theorems in previous section ensure the existence of a unique coherent condi-
tional assessment qa ‘‘close” as much as possible to p. Unluckily such assessment qa could not be deﬁned overall E but only
A. Capotorti et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 718–727 725on Ea. This is because there could be some conditional events EijHi-s such that the Hi-s have null probability for all the
distributions that induce qa. The further steps of the procedure extend qa to the rest of E so that Dðp; aÞ remains minimum.
Coherence for the correction qa requires thataðHiÞ ¼ ðqaÞiaðEiHiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n; ð24Þ
and suppose the ﬁrst t constraints are veriﬁed by any value of ðqaÞi because aðHiÞ ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ; t. For the overall correction
we could take as good only the components ðqaÞj; j ¼ t þ 1; . . . ;n. For the ﬁrst t components we could focus our attention on
the restriction of the assessment p2 ¼ ðp1; . . . ; ptÞ that could be seen as an initial assessment on the sub-domain
E2 ¼ fE1jH1; . . . ; Et jHtg. If such assessment p2 results by itself incoherent, we could correct it with the same methodology
illustrated before, obtaining a qa2 ¼ ðqa2 Þ1; . . . ; ðqa2 Þt
 
from which to select only the signiﬁcant components, i.e. those
ðqa2 Þj with associated conditioning event Hj with positive probability a2ðHjÞ. This procedure can be iterated, at worst n times,
with uniqueness of the signiﬁcant components at each step. Obviously, whenever the conditions of Corollary 7 are fulﬁlled,
i.e. whenever there exists a minimizing distribution a such that aðHiÞ > 0 for all i, the procedure will produce the unique
coherent correction qa through a single iteration. This can happen for example if we have an unconditional initial assessment
p.
Let us describe the full procedure in details.
Let E; p; X; A0 be deﬁned as in Section 2, then:
(i0) Setl :¼ 1;
El :¼ E;
pl :¼ p;
Xl :¼ X;
Al0 :¼ A0;(i1) Let a^l be a solution of the nonlinear optimization programmin Dðpl; a0Þ ð25Þ
s:t: a0 2 Al0; ð26Þ(i2) Let ~al be a solution of the mixed integer programmax
X
Ei jHi2El
I a0ðHiÞð Þ ð27Þ
s:t: a0 2 Al0; ð28Þ
Dðpl; a0Þ ¼ Dðpl; a^lÞ; ð29Þ
I a0ðHiÞð Þ ¼
1 if a0ðHiÞ > 0;
0 if a0ðHiÞ ¼ 0:

ð30Þ(i3) For any EjjHj 2 El, if ~alðHjÞ > 0 then setq~alð Þj :¼
~alðEjHjÞ
~alðHjÞ ; ð31Þ(i4) SetElþ1 :¼ EjjHj 2 El : ~alðHjÞ ¼ 0
n o
;
plþ1 :¼ pj 2 pl : ~alðHjÞ ¼ 0
 
;
Xlþ1 :¼ xw 2 Xl : ~alw ¼ 0
n o
;
Alþ10 :¼ a0 2 Al0 : a0
_
Ej jHj2El
Hj
0@ 1A ¼ 1
8<:
9=;;
l :¼ lþ 1;(i5) If El – ; then return to (i1) else exit.
As coherent correction of p we get the assessment q~a generated by the distributions ~a1; . . . ; ~am through (31).
Since the various ~al’s are probability distributions over the respective Al0 and the ðq~aÞj; j ¼ 1; . . . ;n, are obtained through
(31), coherence of the overall q~a derives from theorem of Coletti in [5] that we report here for completeness:
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generated by the events E1;H1; . . . ; En;Hn. A real function q is a coherent conditional probability assessment on E if and only if there
exists (at least) a class of probabilities fa0; . . . ; atg such that each al is deﬁned on a subset Xl#X0 and for any EijHi 2 E there is a
unique al with PX
xj #Hi
alj > 0; qðEijHiÞ ¼
xj # EiHi
aljP
xj #Hi
alj
; ð32Þand Xl0 	 Xl00 for l0 > l00; al00j ¼ 0 if xj 2 Xl0.
Note that, by Theorem 6, the objective function (27) of the mixed integer programs in (i2) guarantees the identiﬁcation of
a maximum number of signiﬁcant components for q~a. The constraint (29) restricts the search of the optimal solution
amongst those that minimize the discrepancy Dðp; Þ, as determined in (i1). Operationally, such mixed integer programs
(27)–(30) can be solved through equivalent ordinary nonlinear programs.
Note moreover that the optimal solutions a^l and ~al of the optimization problems in (i1) and (i2) are auxiliary components.
Actually, our attention is focused on q~a as ‘‘best” approximation of p, that implicitly admits as reasonable models not only the
~al’s that had generated it, but also all other agreeing distributions.
Obviously, if the initial assessment p is coherent ‘‘per se” overall E but involving events Hi with compulsory null proba-
bility, the procedure generates a coincident assessment q~a  p. In fact any sub-assessment pl results a coherent assessment
over Xl, hence the nonlinear problems in steps (i1) return optimal values a^l such that Dðpl; a^lÞ ¼ 0. Consequently constraints
(29) guarantee that also the optimal solutions ~al of steps (i2) have Dðpl; ~alÞ ¼ 0 and hence, by Theorem 1, condition (ii), we get
q~al  pl. The fact that ~al-s are optimal solutions of the mixed integer programs (27)–(30) implies the use of the least number
of zero-layers in the reconstruction of p.
A direct implementation of our procedure could incur in complexity troubles. The veriﬁcation of coherence is already a
NP-complete problem ‘‘per se”. As a consequence, our nonlinear optimization problems (i1) and (i2) are even harder. Modern
optimization tools like GAMS [1] make medium-size problems treatable with some tens of events. The main dimensional
problem is that an explicit expression of the unknowns a0 require an Oð3nÞ number of components. In fact, in the worst case
of absence of logical constraints among the Ei’s and the Hi’s, the number of unknowns needed to perform the optimization
problems is 3n  1. Number that reduces to 2n in the special case of an unconditional assessment. But the worst case study is
meaningless for our purpose because any assessment results coherent ‘‘per se”. The actual number of atoms in X is usually
smaller because the presence of logical constraints among the basic events Ei’s and Hi’s, and in particular the more con-
straints are present the less atoms we have. This of course does not solve the dimensional explosion in large-size problems,
where implicit expression of the solution and heuristics are needed.
Note ﬁnally that if we deal with an unconditional assessment p, apart from the relative small beneﬁt in the dimensional
complexity outlined before, we are only assured that all the distributions a that minimize Dðp; Þ lie in A1 so that it will be
needed only one optimization step (i1) to get a distribution ~a and consequently the full correction q~a. The nonlinear nature of
the optimization problem (i1) anyway does not change since the presence of the log’s in the expression of Dðp; a0Þ.
5. Conclusions
With this contribution we intended to give a detailed exposition of the formal properties of the discrepancy Dðp; aÞ.
Thanks in fact to its peculiarities, summarized by the results of the theorems in Section 3, the correction procedure proposed
in Section 4 acquires signiﬁcance and operational soundness.
The discrepancy measure Dðp; aÞ revealed a nice tool not only for the correction procedure, as shown by prototypical
examples in [2], but also to merge different expert opinions in both precise and imprecise probability contexts, as depicted
in [3]. In the latter contribution our approach has been generalized to the imprecise framework by considering several sets of
assessments to approximate by single coherent assessments. In fact we consider the set of assessments V ¼ fvg obtained by
ﬁxing one range bound and letting all other components vary inside the remaining ranges. We can ﬁnd a coherent approx-
imation pa of fvg by minimizing Dðv; aÞ, with v 2 V. This process is iterated by varying the ﬁxed bound, obtaining at the end a
set of coherent assessments whose lower/upper envelope can be adopted as correction of the initial (incoherent) ranges. At
the moment there is an open problem about the uniqueness of each single approximation pa. Empirical studies have corrob-
orated the conjecture of uniqueness, but a formal proof is still missing.
By referring to imprecise probabilities a comparison with Walley’s theory [16] is compulsory. It is known that in Walley’s
behavioral theory, different notions of conditional coherence are possible. As notably remarked in [13], the different notions
can be mainly interpreted in a Bayesian sensitivity style through classes of agreeing (i.e. with values inside the ranges) pre-
cise conditional assessments, so that we can use this formulation to compare his approach with our. A detailed comparison is
outside the scope of the present contribution. Anyhow we can assert that: if the initial assessment avoids partial loss, i.e. the
class of agreeing precise coherent conditional assessments is not empty, our procedure should produce a correction that
coincides with Walley’s notion of natural extension. In particular, if the initial assessment is coherent in Walley’s sense, i.e.
it coincides with the envelope of the agreeing precise coherent conditional assessments, the correction procedure do not
modify it. About Walley’s weak coherence, as proved in [13], its distinction with coherence appears whenever some event
is conditioned to zero probabilities. This means that if we start with an initial assessment that is weakly coherent but not
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while it will change only those that are obliged to have zero-probability. What can be remarked here is that our procedure
acquires relevance in presence of an initial assessment that incurs in a partial loss, i.e. whenever the set of agreeing precise
coherent assessments is empty. In such situation the natural extension procedure cannot be applied, while ours can proceed
undisturbed.
Of course, our proposal is not a panacea to solve incoherence for conditional probability assessments. But the behavioral
origin of the discrepancy through the scoring rule (see Eq. (6)) and its useful decomposition on the separate scenarios (see Eq.
(9)) should be enough to justify its adoption. In fact in [2] we have also made some numerical comparisons among correc-
tions obtained through other divergencies. Those that performed similarly to our discrepancy Dðp; aÞ were those with only
geometrical motivations, like usual L1 and L2 metric distances suggested in [15], but without either an intuitive or a prob-
abilistic interpretation to be used as distances between conditional assessments. A straightforward adaptation of the usual
logarithmic Bregman divergence to conditional probabilities produced less meaningful results, especially in presence of
‘‘heavy” incoherences in the initial assessment. This is mainly because in its generating logarithmic scoring rule only the
events that occur are taken, without considering those that turn out to be false. On the other side, others more intuitive
divergences, that could maintain the relative proportions among the components pi’s, or among components pi’s and their
complements 1 pi, expressed computational drawbacks due to the presence of local minima.
The main development of our work will be to ﬁnd practical applications where to test the effective goodness of the results
and the effective solvability of the optimization steps (i1) and (i2) with large scale domains.
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